ALBANIA UNDER PRINCE WIED
The Dutch Military Mission to Albania 1913 - 1914
English | Shqip
Acknowledgement
Each of the Dutch officers sent to Albania in 1913-1914 to set up the gendarmerie of the newly
created Albanian State was seconded to the Balkans not only with his normal military equipment,
but also - to our good fortune - with a camera. The men recorded what they saw and experienced at
a defining moment in Albanian history: the nation’s late independence after five hundred years of
Ottoman rule, the arrival of a new German sovereign to reign over his tiny Balkan kingdom, and
the country’s descent into chaos precipitated by domestic strife, the Balkan Wars and the outbreak
of World War I. Many of the photos of the Dutch officers have survived the decades to be
presented here. Most of the pictures have never been seen by the general public before.
Photo Captions
This photo collection, first published in the album Writing in Light: Early Photography of
Albania and Southwest Balkans, Prishtina 2007, contains many unique views of a lost world, ones
which are sure to captivate all those interested in Albanian and Balkan history. We are grateful to
the families of the Dutch officers, many of whom preserved the collections of old glass slides and
offered them generously for this publication. Thanks go, in conclusion, to others who have helped
make the collection available, among whom: the Netherlands Institute for Military History
(Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie) in The Hague and its documentalist Okke Groot, as
well as Durim Bani (The Hague), Jolien Berendsen-Prins of the Thomson Foundation (Groningen),
Kastriot Dervishi (Tirana), Gerda Mulder of the Nederlands Fotomuseum (Rotterdam), Harrie
Teunissen (Leiden) and Richard van den Brink (Utrecht).
History of the Dutch Military Mission
Albania was part of the Ottoman Empire from the age of the Turkish conquest of the southwestern
Balkan Peninsula in about 1390-1400 to the final collapse of the once mighty realm, then known as
the Sick Man of Europe, in 1912. In the course of these five centuries, most of the originally
Christian population had converted to Islam and adopted the customs and lifestyle of the Orient.
Albanians also made a substantial contribution to the Ottoman Empire. Many viziers, grand viziers
(prime ministers) and high administrative and military figures ruling the Empire were of Albanian
origin.
It was in the last decades of the nineteenth century, a period of sharp decline in the fortunes of the
Ottoman Empire, that an Albanian national movement arose. For the first time, ethnic identity
became more important among the educated population than religious affiliation or imperial glory.
The Albanians increasingly longed for autonomy and self-determination within the Empire - the
thought of political independence was as yet a distant dream. This movement, known as Rilindja
(Rebirth), crystallised in the so-called League of Prizren in the years 1878-1881. Yet despite the
awakening of a national movement, Albania was to be ruled from Constantinople for another thirty
years.
In July 1908, the Ottoman Empire was finally shaken out of its lethargy by the Revolution of the
Young Turks. This internal revolt initially received substantial support from Albanian leaders in
Istanbul and Thessalonica. Nonetheless, soon after it had occurred, most educated Albanians came
to realise that, with regard to demands for Albanian autonomy within the Empire, the Young Turks
were no better than the old. With none of their grievances met, Northern Albania and Kosova were
in almost constant revolt from 1909 to 1912.
Albania did not play a prominent role in the Balkan Wars that raged in the Peninsula in 1912-1913,
although, as a de facto part of the Ottoman Empire, it did not escape the conflagration. During the
first Balkan War from October 1912 to May 1913, the Albanians found themselves in an extremely
awkward position, between a rock and a hard place. There had been numerous major uprisings in
Albania against the Turks, but Albanian leaders were now more concerned about the expansion of
the coalition of Christian forces in Montenegro, Serbia and Greece than they were about the
weakened Ottoman military presence in their country. What they wanted was to preserve the
territorial integrity of Albania. Within two months, Ottoman forces had all but capitulated, and it
was only in Shkodra and Janina that Turkish garrisons were able to maintain position for a while.
The very existence of the country was threatened.
It was at this time that Ismail Kemal bey Vlora (1844-1919), known in Albanian as Ismail Qemali,
returned to Albania with Austro-Hungarian support and declared Albanian independence in the
town of Vlora on 28 November 1912. Though this declaration of independence proved historic for
the Albanian people, it was more theoretical than real. The Montenegrins had taken Lezha and
Shëngjin and were besieging Shkodra; the Serbs had seized not only Kosova and western
Macedonia, but also Elbasan, Tirana and Durrës; and the Greeks had invaded Saranda and
stationed their forces on the island of Sazan outside the Bay of Vlora. Fighting continued in and
around Shkodra from March until May 1913, by which time both Turkish and Serb troops began to
withdraw from the country.
Albanian independence was given international recognition at the so-called Conference of the
Ambassadors, held in London in 1912-1913. This conference of the six Great Powers (Britain,
France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Italy) began its work at the Foreign Office on 17
December 1912 under the direction of the British foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey (1862-1933).
With regard to Albania, the ambassadors had initially decided that the country would be recognized
as an autonomous state under the sovereignty of the sultan. After much discussion, however, they
reached a formal decision on 29 July 1913 that Albania would be an autonomous, sovereign and
hereditary principality by right of primogeniture, guaranteed by the six Powers. Albanian
independence had thus been recognized, even though the authority of the new Albanian provisional
government, formed on 5 July 1913, did not extend much beyond Vlora.
The new sovereign was to be designated by the six Great Powers upon the proposal of the two
most-interested nations, Austria-Hungary and Italy. Their choice fell upon the German prince,
Wilhelm zu Wied (1876-1945). Prince Wied was born of a noble protestant family in Neuwied on
the Rhine, situated between Bonn and Koblenz. His mother was Marie, Princess of Holland. An
officer in the Prussian army, Wied was a cousin of the German Emperor, and was the nephew of
Queen Elizabeth of Romania. He was married to Princess Sophie (1885-1936) of Schönburg-
Waldenburg in Saxony. In October 1913, the Great Powers offered him, as a compromise
candidate, the throne of the newly independent country of Albania, a land about which he knew
very little at the time. On 1 November 1913, after due reflection and imposing certain conditions of
his own, Wied agreed to accept the Albanian throne, and arrived in Durrës on 7 March 1914 aboard
the Austro-Hungarian naval vessel Taurus.
The chaotic political situation both within Albania and with Albania’s neighbours made it virtually
impossible for the well-meaning prince to reign. Left to fend for himself, he received little or no
financial or military backing from abroad, in particular as a result of the outbreak of World War I.
On 3 September 1914, after six months on the throne, Wied abandoned Albania aboard the Italian
vessel Misurata, though without formally abdicating. He never returned.
In July 1913, the newly recognized principality of Albania needed not only a sovereign, but also
fixed borders, a government and - what was of no small significance - a military police force to
guarantee the prince’s rule and to ensure law and order in the country. The Conference of
Ambassadors resolved that public order and security should be assured by an internationally
organised gendarmerie. This police force was to be in the hands of foreign officers who would
exercise effective command and control. The officers were originally to be selected from the
Swedish army. The Kingdom of Sweden was, however, busy with a similar mission in Persia, so
the choice then fell upon the Netherlands, in particular because the country was neutral, had no
direct interests in Albania, and no doubt because it had a good deal of colonial experience in the
Dutch East Indies where there was a large Muslim population. On 1 August 1913, the Dutch
Government was officially requested to furnish officers to help restore order to Albania.
On 19 September of that year, after internal discussions, the Netherlands notified the International
Control Commission (ICC) that it had accepted the request and would make Dutch officers
available for the mission to Albania. The War Minister Hendrikus Colijn contacted his friend,
Major Lodewijk Thomson (1869-1914), a well-known political and military figure of the age, and
inquired if he would be interested. Thomson, born in Voorschoten near the Hague on 11 June 1869,
had been a Liberal Union member of parliament for Leeuwarden between 1905 and 1912, and had
gained military experience in the Dutch East Indies (especially in northern Sumatra), as an
observer in the Boer War, and at the siege of Janina in northern Greece and in Shkodra during the
first Balkan War. Before his appointment as head of the Dutch mission to Albania could be
finalized, however, the cabinet resigned, and the new War Minister Bosboom decided that other
potential candidates for the post needed to be considered. For this reason, the definitive
appointment of a head of mission was delayed, despite official agreement on an advanced
secondment. When the choice was finally made, by a Royal Decree of 20 October 1913, it fell
upon Colonel Willem De Veer, Commander of the 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, with Thomson of
the 12th Infantry Regiment as his second-in-command. This constellation proved awkward because
De Veer lacked Thomson’s organizational talent and experience.
The advanced mission of the two Dutch officers and their two adjutants, sergeants Van Reijen and
Stok, arrived on 10 November 1913 in Vlora, the seat of the provisional government and of the
International Control Commission. Much time had been wasted and they wanted to tour the
country immediately to get a feel for the problems with which they would be faced. Turkish, Serb
and Montenegrin troops had withdrawn from Albania proper, but there was no unity within the
country. Much of central Albania, north of Vlora, was under the authority of Essad Pasha Toptani
(1864-1920), who has gone down in Albanian history as one of the more devious, conniving and
self-interested figures the country has ever produced. On 16 October 1913 Essad Pasha had formed
his own Government of Durrës, encompassing the coastal region from the Mat to the Shkumbin
rivers.
Departing on 20 November 1913, the Dutch officers were accompanied by Melek bey Frashëri,
who subsequently became Thomson’s adjutant, and by Et’hem bey Vlora, son of Ismail Kemal.
They travelled north to Fier, Berat, Elbasan and to Tirana, where they met Essad Pasha on 25
November. Essad Pasha received them cordially although he showed his displeasure at the
presence of Et’hem bey, the son of his rival. From Durrës, De Veer and Thomson continued on to
Shkodra where they arrived on 29 November to inspect the contingents of international troops
there. In Ndërfushas, they met Prenk Bibë Doda (1858-1920), prestigious chief of the Catholic
Mirdita region. After three weeks of travel and meetings with local leaders in the north and centre
of Albania, De Veer and Thomson returned to Vlora on 9 December.
The border to the south of Albania had not been fixed and Greek troops had occupied large swaths
of the country, refusing to withdraw so long as Albania was not able to guarantee order. The
International Control Commission therefore asked the two officers to set up a military corps to
establish order in the south. The Dutch Government was duly contacted with a request for more
officers. At the same time, De Veer and Thomson mustered an initial 1,000 men in Albania itself -
mostly refugees in Vlora - and from Kosova and Shkodra. In its final form, the new Albanian
gendarmerie would have 5,000 men at its disposal, of whom about 800 had received proper
training. On 24 December 1913, Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands officially appointed De
Veer as head of the new Albanian gendarmerie corps.
In early January 1914, Albania was faced with an uprising of pro-Ottoman forces which were
opposed to the increasing Western influence in the country. In November 1913, these forces, under
the influence of the Young Turks, had offered the vacant Albanian throne to General Izzet Pasha
(1864-1937), the Turkish War Minister who was of Albanian origin. The confusion which reigned
throughout the land was furthered by Izzet Pasha in his ambitions to divide and rule, in order to
gain the throne. To this end, he sent a Young Turkish officer of Albanian origin called Beqir
Grebena, known in Turkish as Bekir aga Grebenali or Bekir Fikri effendi, from Macedonia to
Albania to stir up trouble and attempt to overthrow the provisional government in a coup d’état. In
Shkodra, Grebena won over the Muslim community who felt disadvantaged by the Austro-
Hungarian Kultusprotektorat, and in Durrës he managed to gain the confidence of Essad Pasha for
a time.
At the end of the year, in support of Grebena, the Young Turks sent 375 soldiers to Vlora, in
civilian disguise, many of whom on board the Austrian steamer Meran. Syreja bey Vlora, however,
caught wind of the undertaking and informed the International Control Commission without delay.
Concerned at the thought of Turkish troops landing in Vlora, the ICC gave the Dutch officers full
powers to act as they saw fit. On 6 January 1914, Thomson and De Veer immediately incorporated
the local police into the new gendarmerie, which had been originally designed to take control of
the south, and seized the telegraph and customs offices. When the Meran arrived in Vlora, they
managed to capture and disarm the 19 officers and sent the 161 soldiers via Trieste back to
Istanbul. Beqir Grebena was sentenced to death.
At the same time, Essad Pasha, who was the only person in Albania to have a self-contained army
of his own, strove to grab as much of the country as he could. On 9 January, his men tried to take
Elbasan, but they were repulsed by the governor of the town, Akif Pasha Biçaku, also known as
Aqif Pasha Elbasani.
In his memorandum on Albania, published in August 1917, Prince Wied noted that “Essad Pasha
and Ismail Kemal bey were at loggerheads and were plotting against one another in every possible
way. Essad, who was by far the more important and powerful of the two, was endeavouring to
expand his rule southwards to Elbasan. Using gifts and promises, he was cunningly able to extend
his influence and that of his followers and relatives. He never openly opposed the International
Commission, but rather slithered around it like an eel, constantly affirming his loyalty and claiming
that he was ever ready to serve Europe and his new sovereign. Even at that time, the reports on his
behaviour from the International Commission gave rise to suspicions that he was double dealing
and only had the expansion of his power in mind. The influence of Ismail Kemal in the south was
in constant decline. He lacked requisite military backing, as opposed to Essad who could rely both
on the troops he had withdrawn from Shkodra and on fresh forces... There was no finance
administration serving the interests of the country. Essad Pasha had his hands on the customs duties
in Durrës, and Ismail Kemal bey on the customs revenues in Vlora. The two had thus put the
country’s main sources of income to the service of their own personal needs. Ismail Kemal devoted
a portion of the customs revenue to caring for the refugees and to the creation of a new
gendarmerie corps, but Essad Pasha refused categorically to devote any public monies he had
collected to these two expenditures, which the country so needed at the time. The Dutch officers
who, in lieu of the Swedish officers originally foreseen, had been entrusted with the task of
building up an international gendarmerie and who were devoting much energy and enthusiasm to
this goal, got no support whatsoever from Essad Pasha in central Albania. He only created
difficulties for them. He hindered their work from start to finish, making it clear that he already
had a good Albanian gendarmerie. The south of Albania was a particular problem. Greece had still
not evacuated the occupied Albanian territories. Numerous bands (komitadji) led by former Greek
officers, no doubt (though not proven) supported by the Greek Government, were working towards
fomenting uprisings and chaos in the region. In the course of its activities, the International
Commission recognised that the elimination of these two powerful figures, Essad Pasha and Ismail
Kemal bey, was an essential prerequisite to bringing peace and quiet to Albania and to enabling the
new sovereign to ascend the throne. They recognised that the time was ripe to do away with Essad
Pasha and Ismail Kemal bey because, in their view, the former had become too big for his boots
and the latter was responsible for serious mismanagement. This view was strengthened by their
involvement in the failed plot of the Young Turks which had endeavoured to install the Turkish
General Izzet Pasha as ruler of Albania. The International Commission succeeded in persuading
Ismail Kemal bey to resign from his position as president of the “provisional government,” for
which he was eminently unsuited, but Essad Pasha continued to rule unimpeded as Head of the
Executive of the Senate for Central Albania.” (1)
Ismail Kemal bey Vlora was forced to leave Albania at the demand of the International Control
Commission, but the Commission did not have enough authority to force Essad to do the same.
Essad thus stayed put and only agreed to give up government if he were allowed to lead the
Albanian deputation travelling to Germany in February 1914 to offer the Albanian throne to Prince
Wied.
On 23 February 1914, the rest of the Dutch officers arrived in Vlora, two weeks before the arrival
of the Prince. They were first lieutenant Gerard Mallinckrodt, who became Thomson’s adjutant; the
captains Wouter De Waal, Hugo Verhulst, Henri Kroon, Joan Snellen van Vollenhoven, Lucas
Roelfsema and Johan Sluys; and the first lieutenants Carel De Iongh, Jetze Doorman, Jan Fabius,
Julius Sonne, Hendrik Reimers and Jan Sar. Interestingly enough, part of the equipment which
each received for his tour of duty was a camera. The contingent was completed by the health
officer Tiddo Reddingius, a medical orderly sergeant J. van Vliet, and a civilian physician by the
name of F. De Groot. Before the start of their mission to Albania, all of them had been promoted by
one rank.
The Dutch officers were swiftly distributed throughout the country. Sluys, Roelfsema and Sar were
sent to Durrës, Kroon and Fabius to Shkodra, Snellen van Vollenhoven and Doorman to Korça,
Verhulst and Reimers to Elbasan, De Waal and Sonne to Gjirokastra, and De Iongh remained with
De Veer in Vlora.
Chaos reigned in southern Albania and Epirus in the first half of 1914. Many of the Greeks, who
made up about one-fifth of the population there, demanded unification with Greece. Greek troops
had occupied Gjirokastra and Korça during the second Balkan War and, despite international
admonition, had been refusing to withdraw up until February, when Austria-Hungary threatened to
use force against them. In Gjirokastra, a provisional (Greek) government for Northern Epirus was
set up, which was supported politically and militarily by Jorgios Christaki Zographos, the governor
of Epirus and Greek minister of foreign affairs (1912-1915). The Greek army became more and
more actively involved in supporting groups of armed guerillas and bandits, and by mid-April
1914, Greek forces had seized territory up to a line running from Himara to Përmet and Leskovik.
The meagre forces of the Dutch officers were hopelessly outnumbered.
In March 1914, soon after his arrival in Albania, Prince Wied appointed Thomson as general
commissioner for the south. This appointment was much to the relief of De Veer who wanted to be
rid of the temperamental Thomson. On 10 March, Thomson arrived in Corfu to negotiate with
Greek forces, largely overstepping his mandate. Soon thereafter, on 6 April, Wied issued a decree
for the conscription of all Albanian men aged 20 and 21. The Italian War Minister encouraged the
Prince to march on Gjirokastra, assuring him of Italian support.
The situation in the south of the country continued to be difficult. In mid-May, in an attempt to
regain control of Gjirokastra, De Waal and his men, assisted by a corps of Albanian volunteers
under Çerçiz Topulli, reached the Drino river and heard firing at the nearby Orthodox monastery of
Kodra, near Tepelena. A terrible scene was discovered - the bodies of 218 old people, women and
children who had been massacred by Greek forces. Some of the victims, Albanian Orthodox
Christians, had been crucified, and others hacked to pieces. General De Veer reported to the ICC
about the tragic event on 10 May: “South of the village of Kodra (Hormova), I found a little church
which was undoubtedly used as a prison. In the interior the walls and the floor were washed in
blood, everywhere were caps and clothing soaked in blood. The doctor, member of the
Commission of Investigation, himself saw human brains. At the altar we found a human heart
which was still bleeding. A hundred and ninety-five bodies were dug out because the ditch they
were thrown in was too shallow, so as to bury them in deeper graves; all the bodies were without
heads.” In the House of Commons in London, Aubrey Herbert (1880-1923) spoke passionately
about the massacre, but Western public opinion had had enough of Balkan atrocities and there was
little reaction.
De Waal himself tried to storm Gjirokastra on 12 May with the help of a volunteer corps under Sali
Butka (1857-1938), but was cut off by Greek troops under General Papoulias.
A political agreement, the Disposition of Corfu, was reached on 17 May 1914, under which
Northern Epirus would remain part of Albania, but would be under the control of the International
Control Commission. The parliament of (Greek) Northern Epirus, however, refused to ratify the
agreement, and the fighting continued well into the summer when, on 8 July, Korça fell to Greek
troops under General George Tsontos Vardhas.
Despite the arrival of Wied in Durrës, power in central Albania was firmly in the hands of Essad
Pasha who had somehow managed to have himself appointed by Wied as war minister. As such, he
was bound to come into conflict with the Dutch military mission which commanded the only
officially armed troops in the country. Essad Pasha had promised to muster 20,000 reservists to
march against the Greeks, but being himself in close contact with Greek rebel leaders, he did not
keep his word.
In early May 1914, Essad Pasha withdrew discreetly to his country estate near Tirana, and soon
thereafter rumours spread of an armed rebellion in Shijak and Kruja. It was obvious to Wied and
the Dutch officers that Essad Pasha had his hand in the unrest.
Machine guns and mountain guns were delivered to Durrës from Austria to help defend the town,
and Essad Pasha, who turned up on 18 May, was intent on getting his fingers on them to hand them
over to the Italian military attachés, Muricchio and Moltedo. Johan Sluys, not trusting the Italians,
insisted the cannons be manned by the officers Klingspor and Tomjenovic who had been seconded
with them to train the men how to operate them. Essad Pasha demanded an audience with Prince
Wied, whom he pressured to remove Major Sluys. As a result, the command of the military corps
in Durrës was transferred for a time to Roelfsema.
Rumours spread that Essad Pasha was housing 200 men and ammunition in his house in Durrës to
prepare a coup d’état. On the morning of 19 May 1914, Sluys surrounded Essad Pasha’s house and
tried to disarm his guards. When Klingspor fired a cannon shot, destroying part of Essad’s roof,
and then another which burst into Essad’s bedroom, the unscrupulous war minister gave up and
surrendered. Wied had his minister interned on the Austro-Hungarian warship Szigetvar which was
anchored in the bay of Durrës. De Veer and Thomson arrived the next day from Vlora with proof,
in the form of coded telegrams, of Essad Pasha’s treachery and collusion with the Italians. The
Italian ambassador Baron Carlo Alberto Aliotti, however, persuaded Wied not to press charges and
to exile Essad Pasha to Italy, where the latter was received as a martyr for the Italian cause.
Essad Pasha was gone, but unrest in central Albania continued. The region around Shijak, between
Durrës and Tirana, had been settled in part by Bosnian Muslims following the Austrian occupation
of Bosnia in 1878. These people were uneasy about the fall of their Muslim Ottoman Empire and
were wary of the Prince from the Christian West who had been imposed upon their country.
Whatever the reason was for the uprising in Shijak and Kavaja that began on 17 May 1914 (the
exiled Essad Pasha may have been a major figure behind the scenes), it constituted a direct threat
to the administration of Wied in nearby Durrës.
General De Veer gave Roelfsema orders to take Rrashbull, an elevation a few kilometres from
Durrës and strategically important for its defence. Roelfsema and his men, mostly volunteers from
Kosova under their leader Isa Boletini (1864-1916), took the hill on 20 May and met with no
resistance. Plundering ensued and, fearful of a reaction, Roelfsema withdrew his forces. The small
Dutch gendarmerie was no match for the large rebel forces which were converging on Durrës. The
situation improved, however, when a ship arrived from the north with 150 volunteers from
Catholic Mirdita and the northern mountains under Simon Doda, nephew of Prenk Bibë Doda. In
order to secure military assistance, the Prince had made Prenk the new foreign minister of the
country.
On 22 May 1914, Jan Sar took the new troops under his command with 65 of his own gendarmes
and set off in the direction of Tirana with an expeditionary force to establish order. On 23 May,
they passed Rrashbull and engaged the Muslim rebels. The volunteer forces from the north,
however, refused to attack the rebels because a general besa (cease-fire) had been agreed on the
occasion of Wied’s accession to the throne. When they abandoned ranks and fled, Sar and forty of
his men were surrounded and captured. Edith Durham later wrote of this incident: “A party of
armed men, led by one of the Dutch officers, went to parley with the insurgents, and took a
machine gun. Unluckily, Captain Sar was ignorant of local customs. He and his party were unduly
nervous, for when an Albanian has given his besa (peace oath), he keeps it. Alarmed unnecessarily,
he ordered his men to fire at a group of three armed men. One escaped, fled to Shijak and spread
the alarm that the Prince had begun to massacre Moslems. A number of people rushed to aid the
Shijak men, and a fight took place.” (2)
When news reached Durrës of the capture of Sar, Dutch forces prepared an expedition to free him,
but the rebels had captured Rrashbull and were already firing on Durrës with their light weapons.
Roelfsema advanced with a unit, but was surrounded and taken prisoner, too. Panic broke out in
Durrës, and the royal family sought refuge on an Italian vessel which was anchored in the bay.
Ambassador Aliotti had persuaded Wied to take his family to safety there, and once they were on
board, he ordered the captain of the ship to sail farther away from the coastline, thus preventing
Wied from returning to land. This ‘flight’ severely damaged Wied’s reputation among the
Albanians.
The rebels released Jan Sar that evening and sent him to Durrës to present their demands, among
which were a total amnesty and the restoration of the sultan. Wied appointed Colonel Thomson as
commander of Durrës and, as there was no more war minister, as “directeur de la force armée.”
Thomson was thus the prince’s principal military advisor. De Veer begrudgingly acceded and
withdrew to Vlora on 4 June, subsequently returning to Holland.
The newly created Principality of Albania had in reality now been reduced to a modest few
kilometres of territory in and around Durrës. Thomson began constructing defence fortifications to
protect the town, and brought all native and foreign fighters in Durrës under his strict control. An
artillery unit was set up under Captain Fabius, who had returned from Shkodra, which had been
occupied by international troops. The Italians were now secretly supporting the rebels. Wied
described the situation at the time as follows: “The first days of June brought irrefutable proof of
the long-held suspicion that the Italians were colluding with the rebels. On my vehement objection,
the Italian ambassador Aliotti suspended his daily automobile trips to the rebels. Instead of this,
however, we now observed secret flashing lights used by the Italians to communicate with the
rebels. Thomson finally managed to catch three Italians in the act (Captain Muricchio, Captain
Moltedo and the mysterious Professor Chinigo). Documents incriminating them were also found
when they were searched. There were great problems with Italy because the capitulations were said
to have been infringed upon when the Italian mission was entered by force to arrest them. Pointing
to the capitulation law, Aliotti demanded that those under arrest be released, and released they
were. Thomson, however, repeatedly rejected Aliotti’s other demand to retract publicly the
newspaper reports that the Italians had been exchanging signals with the rebels and had been in
continuous personal contact with them, insisting that the demand was wrong and that complying
with it would be incompatible with his honour as an officer: (3) “Volontiers je donnerais ma vie au
Roi, mais jamais mon honneur.” Aliotti now demanded that Thomson be sent back to Holland, thus
depriving the city of Durrës of an industrious and energetic protector. This controversy came to a
tragic end soon thereafter with the death of Thomson, which occurred on 15 June 1914 during a
fierce rebel attack.”
That day, the rebels had stormed and taken Rrashbull, and two days later they were preparing to
attack Durrës. Jan Fabius, described by the Prince’s personal secretary, Duncan Heaton-Armstrong
(1886-1969), as the most reckless and dashing of the Dutch officers, was on guard at the time and
woke the defendants of the town with a cannon shot early on the morning of 17 June. Sar was sent
to hold the hills to the north of town, and Roelfsema commanded the trenches to the west, where
the brunt of the attack was to occur. Thomson inspected the artillery unit and joined Roelfsema
near the petrol dump, less than three hundred metres from the enemy line. At the very start of the
attack, Thomson was hit in the chest and died of his wounds within a few minutes. Whether, as
rumoured, an Italian sniper was behind his death will never be known for certain. Prince Wied had,
at any rate, lost his best man, but the defences of the town withstood the onslaught.
On the next day, Thomson was laid to rest in a widely attended funeral on 16 June 1914. Even a
number of rebels, in compliance with Albanian tradition and chivalry, made their way into town to
attend the solemn occasion. In early July, Thomson’s body was returned to Amsterdam aboard the
cruiser Noord-Brabant and, after a lying-in-state there, the much-lauded hero was buried in
Groningen on 18 July 1914.
The political situation was not much better for the Dutch officers in the other parts of the country.
Verhulst had endeavoured to reach Tirana from Elbasan, but was taken captive. Reimers, too, was
taken prisoner in Elbasan. De Iongh in Fier hoped to make use of the men of the influential Vlora
family and of the landowning Vrioni family in Berat, but Aziz Pasha Vrioni preferred to retain his
fighters to defend the region from the Greeks. De Iongh set out across the Seman river but only
managed to hold out in Fier for three weeks. On 17 June, Major Kroon, who had arrived from
Lezha to succeed Thomson, attacked Rrashbull once more, but was unsuccessful.
The situation was so desperate that on 21 June 1914, Akif Pasha Biçaku sought a cease-fire with
the Muslim rebels who were led by the Melami dervish, Haxhi Qamili; the mufti of Tirana, Musa
Qazimi; the sheikh of Shijak, Hamdi Rubejka; Mustafa Ndroqi; and the one-time Turkish officer,
Qamil Haxhi Fejza of Elbasan. The Dutch officers strongly disapproved and declared that they
would henceforth leave the military to others and would devote themselves to the original purpose
of their mission, which was organizing the gendarmerie. Events in Albania were, however, soon
overshadowed by the assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand (1863-1914) in
Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 and the subsequent outbreak of World War I. The Dutch officers in
Albania were gradually replaced by a volunteer corps of ca. 150 German and Austrian officers who
arrived in Durrës on 4 July, organized by the Austrian sculptor Gustav Gurschner (1873-1970),
who had designed Prince Wied’s uniforms and medals, and by detachments of Romanian
volunteers who arrived in Durrës on 7 and 17 July.
Berat fell to the rebels on 12 July and Vlora was occupied without a struggle on 21 August. By
mid-summer, at any rate, with the fall of most of central Albania, public opinion in the Netherlands
had it that the continued presence of the Dutch military mission in Albania would only result in a
further loss of life, and General De Veer was pressed to tender his formal resignation and that of
his men. This was done officially on 27 July 1914, one day before Austria-Hungary declared war
on Serbia. On 4 August, most of the officers departed and returned to the Netherlands as quickly as
they could; although, due to the war situation, some of them ran into substantial difficulties on their
journey. Verhulst and Reimers were released in Shijak on 19 September and departed for Holland
the next day. The Dutch adventure in the Balkans was over. It had lasted less than one year.
Robert Elsie
(1) Wilhelm zu Wied, Denkschrift über Albanien, Berlin 1917, p. 12-13.
(2) Edith Durham: Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle, London 1920, p. 265.
(3) Wilhelm zu Wied, Denkschrift über Albanien, Berlin 1917, p. 21.